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Servicing Assets and Gain-On-Securitization under SFAS 156 
 
Abstract 
SFAS No. 156 was issued in 2006 to amend SFAS No.140 which addresses the 
accounting for servicing of financial assets and requires fair value accounting for the initial 
measurement of such servicing assets or liabilities. These servicing assets or liabilities are 
created at the time of a securitization contract. Under SFAS No. 156, the servicing asset or 
liability is no longer measured based on an allocated amount, but instead a fair value has to be 
reached directly. Gain on assets securitizations (GOS), under SFAS No. 140, was questioned as a 
vehicle for earnings management. The research question we address is whether GOS under 
SFAS No. 156 is more or less associated with management’s incentives to manage earnings. 
First, we examine GOS for firm-quarters before and after the adoption of SFAS No. 156 to 
initially assess the association. We then focus on servicing assets as a component of GOS and 
evaluate the quality of servicing assets recognition. Our results indicate that there is a stronger 
association between GOS and both income before GOS and change in income before GOS, 
which are both benchmarks commonly used by management in their earnings management 
decisions. This provides evidence that SFAS No. 156 provides a vehicle for banks to smooth 
their income through GOS. In evaluating whether the quality of servicing asset recognition is 
related to the earnings management incentives, we find evidence that earnings smoothing is 
higher when the estimation error of the servicing asset on the balance sheet is higher.  
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1. Introduction 
Asset securitization is the structured process whereby interests in loans and other 
receivables are packaged, underwritten, and sold in the form of ―asset-backed‖ securities.1 It has 
been a popular method of financing by financial institutions in which they transfer their financial 
assets or loans to another entity, typically a special-purpose entity. If the securitization is treated 
as a sale and the financial institution retains some servicing rights to the loans, it is required to 
record a servicing asset (liability) if the expected cash inflows exceed (fall short of) the 
obligations from the servicing contract. In March 2006, the Financial Accounting Standard 
Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 156, Accounting 
for Servicing of Financial Assets—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 140. SFAS No. 156 is 
one of several statements that amend SFAS No. 140, Accounting for Transfer and Servicing of 
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities.
2
 SFAS No. 156 addresses the accounting for 
servicing of financial assets and requires fair value accounting for the initial measurement of 
such servicing assets or liabilities. Under SFAS No. 140, it was established that upon transfer of 
financial assets, if service is retained by the transferor, a servicing asset or liability should be 
separately recognized on the transferor’s balance sheet, initially measured at an amount allocated 
based on the transferred financial assets’ relative fair values. SFAS No. 156 amended SFAS No. 
140 by requiring servicing assets or liabilities be initially measured at fair value. Similar to SFAS 
No. 140, servicing assets or liabilities represent part of the considerations received in the 
financial asset transfer transaction. In other words, the recognition and measurement of such 
                                                          
1
 See the Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks’ handbook at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/assetsec.pdf 
2
 As of December 2008, SFAS No. 140 was amended by SFAS No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial 
Instruments—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 133 and 140, and SFAS No. 156. On the FASB’s agenda, SFAS 
No. 140 is still pending for further amendments.   
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servicing assets or liabilities has a direct, dollar-for-dollar impact on the calculation of gain or 
loss on the transaction. 
Gain on asset securitizations (GOS), under SFAS No. 140, has been questioned as yet 
another convenient vehicle for earnings management (Dechow, Myers, Shakespeare 2008). 
Under SFAS No. 156, servicing asset or liability is no longer measured based on an allocated 
amount, but instead a fair value has to be reached directly. Considering that there is no active 
trading market for such servicing asset or liability and that costs and benefits to service each 
underlying financial asset is unique to estimate, measurement of the servicing asset or liability is 
challenging and critical for the quality of GOS. The question is whether moving to SFAS 156 
has changed the ability of banks to use GOS as an earnings management vehicle. This paper 
deals with this critical component of GOS--the servicing asset, in evaluating gain on assets 
securitization before and after SFAS No. 156.       
The research question we address is whether GOS under SFAS No. 156 is more or less 
associated with management’s incentives to manage earnings. First, we examine GOS as a whole, 
in firm-quarters before and after the adoption of SFAS No. 156 to initially assess the association. 
We then focus on servicing assets as a component of GOS and evaluate the quality of servicing 
assets recognition. Under both SFAS No. 140 and No. 156, GOS is calculated based on different 
financial components (the financial-components approach). Not all components are reported 
separately and the dollar-for-dollar impact that each component has on GOS cannot be observed 
directly. However, the amount of servicing asset or liability is required to be disclosed separately 
on the balance sheet. By studying this specific component we further ascertain whether servicing 
assets contributes to earnings management behavior under SFAS No. 156.   
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By testing whether GOS still holds as a vehicle for earnings management after the 
adoption of SFAS No. 156, we extend prior research on GOS under SFAS No. 140 (Dechow, 
Myers, Shakespeare 2008). Our results indicate that there is a stronger association between GOS 
and both income before GOS and change in income before GOS, which are both benchmarks 
commonly used by management for current income. This provides evidence that SFAS No. 156 
has not eliminated the ability of banks to smooth their income through GOS. On the contrary, 
banks have higher GOS, all else equal, post SFAS 156. 
Secondly, we evaluate whether the quality of servicing asset recognition is related to the 
earnings management incentives. This study employs one proxy—the net servicing fees, as the 
indicator of quality of servicing asset valuation. We find evidence that earnings smoothing is 
higher when the estimation error of the servicing asset on the balance sheet is higher. It seems 
that the quality of servicing asset valuation is affected by earnings management incentives. More 
studies of the quality of servicing asset valuation are needed to further explore this aspect.  
This study contributes to the growing literature examining the accounting for financial 
asset securitization (Niu and Richardson 2006, Chen, Liu and Ryan 2008, Landsman, Peasnell 
and Shakespeare 2008; Dechow, Myers, Shakespeare 2008). Given the financial crisis looming 
over mortgage loans securitization and the criticism on reporting standards of asset securitization, 
this line of study is much needed to advance our understanding of the valuation process for 
securitized financial assets such as mortgage backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO). 
This study differs from the previous studies in that it focuses on one specific component 
that contributes to the GOS--the servicing assets. Unlike previous studies that study GOS as a 
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whole and focus on the market participants’ perception of the GOS (Niu and Richardson 2006, 
Chen, Liu and Ryan 2008, Landsman, Peasnell and Shakespeare 2008), this study looks at the 
determinant of GOS. Given that some determinants of GOS are not observable to financial 
statement users, the estimated nature of fair value accounting is also addressed.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the accounting for 
financial asset transfers and highlights the changes from SFAS No. 140 to No. 156. Previous 
studies on asset securitization are also reviewed in this section. Section 3 discusses the research 
questions and research design. Data collection, sampling procedure, and the empirical results are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Accounting for servicing assets 
A servicing asset (liability) is clearly defined by SFAS No. 156 as ―a contract to service 
financial assets under which the estimated future revenues from contractually specified servicing 
fees, late charges, and other ancillary revenues are (not) expected to more than adequately 
compensate the servicer for performing the servicing.‖ It is clear that valuation of a servicing 
asset or liability requires estimates of the future, in this case, not only future revenues, but also 
future costs. Following this definition, servicing asset or liability can be considered as an 
accounting accrual in the sense that it adjusts the recognition of cash flows over time so that the 
adjusted numbers (GOS) better reflect performance in the current period (Dechow and Dichev 
2002). In the case of a servicing asset, the adjusted number recognized upon asset securitization, 
is GOS. 
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To account for servicing asset or liability as a separate item on the balance sheet is not a 
novel concept. Although previously not a common practice, it has had a long history in the 
mortgage banking industry. As far back as SFAS No. 65, Accounting for Certain Mortgage 
Banking Activities, issued in 1982, it was established that purchased mortgage servicing assets 
should be accounted for as a separate item carried on the balance sheet. Since the assets are 
purchased at a specified price paid, initial measurement is not an issue. The purchasing price is 
the valuation basis initially carried on the balance sheet, with no income statement effects. SFAS 
No. 65, however, created an asymmetric accounting treatment for purchased versus internally 
originated mortgage servicing assets or liabilities. While purchased servicing assets are 
recognized on the balance sheet, internally originated servicing assets are not, and they reflect no 
value until revenues are collected.  
This asymmetric accounting treatment was corrected by SFAS No. 122, Accounting for 
Mortgage Servicing Rights issued in 1995, where internally originated servicing rights are 
recognized and carried on the balance sheet. The problem is, without a purchasing price, the 
question arises of what the measurement basis for such assets on the balance sheet should be. 
The FASB’s solution is to allocate a portion of total costs of the underlying mortgage loans to 
such servicing assets, based on relative fair values of the loan without the service, and the 
servicing assets. In other words, to facilitate the cost allocation, fair values of both the underlying 
loan without the service, and the servicing assets, have to be measured separately. SFAS No. 122 
was superseded in 1996 by SFAS No. 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial 
Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, which, in turn, was superseded in 2000 by SFAS No. 
140, with the same title.   
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SFAS No. 122 may have been short-lived, but it established an important accounting 
approach carried through the current statement, that has profound income statement implications-
--the financial-components approach. Under the financial-components approach ―after a transfer 
of financial assets, an entity recognizes the financial and servicing assets it controls and the 
liabilities it has incurred, derecognizes financial assets when control has been surrendered and 
derecognizes liabilities when extinguished‖ (SFAS No. 140 Summary). Under SFAS No. 140, 
each financial-component shall be initially measured at fair value, and then be allocated a 
carrying amount. The total amount to be allocated is the cost of the underlying financial assets, 
and the allocation is based on financial-components’ relative fair values at the date of transfer. 
Gains or losses on the asset transfer transaction are calculated based on the allocated carrying 
amounts. Financial-components retained, such as the servicing assets, are treated as 
considerations received in the transaction and contribute to the gain recognition. In other words, 
the estimation of fair value of each and every financial-component is the basis for gain or loss 
recognition. Given the cost-allocation mechanism, financial-components’ impacts on gain 
recognition is indirect, not dollar-for-dollar.    
 
2.2 From SFAS No. 140 to SFAS No. 156 
SFAS No. 156, issued in March 2006, amended SFAS No. 140 by requiring that 
servicing assets be measured at fair value, as opposed to at an amount allocated based on relative 
fair values of all financial components. On the income statement side, the net effect is to change 
servicing assets’ impacts on gain-on-asset-transfer from indirect to direct, dollar-for-dollar.3 An 
                                                          
3
 This study focuses on Gain-on-assets-securitization (GOS). However, SFAS No. 140 and No. 156 address financial 
assets transfers, including both sales and securitizations. The focus is on Gain-on-assets-transferred. 
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illustration given in SFAS No. 140 and amended by SFAS No. 156 helps to contrast the 
difference. 
((Exhibit 1)) 
A company originates $1,000 of loans that yield 10 percent interest income. This 
company then sells the $1,000 principal plus the right to receive interest income of 8 percent to 
another entity for $1,000; service is retained. The company will receive half of the interest 
income not sold and the remaining half is considered an interest-only strip receivable that it 
classifies as an available-for-sale security. At the date of transfer, the fair value of the servicing 
asset and the interest-only strip receivable are $40 and $60, respectively. This means that the fair 
value of the loans, including servicing is $1,100. Under SFAS No. 140, servicing asset is carried 
at $36 ($1,000 cost allocated based on relative fair values of all components, $40/$1100); gain-
on-asset-transfer is $90 (cash proceeds $1,000 less allocated cost of loan, $1,000/$1,100=$910). 
Under SFAS No. 156, servicing asset is carried at $40, its fair value. Gain-on-asset-transfer is 
$94, increased by almost 5% (proceeds from sale of loan and servicing asset, $1,040 less 
allocated carrying amount of loan and servicing asset, $946). The increase in gain comes, dollar-
for-dollar, from the valuation of servicing assets
4
.  
A 5% increase in gain is significant in the above illustration, but what is even more 
significant is the departure from the cost-based gain recognition. Under SFAS No. 140, for 
servicing assets as well as for other financial-components, the carrying amount of each 
component is allocated, and therefore, limited to the cost of the asset transferred. By requiring 
                                                          
4
 SFAS No. 156 addresses the measurement basis for servicing assets and liabilities only, but not for other financial 
components. Until SFAS No. 140 is further amended, under SFAS No. 156, other components such as the interest-
only strip receivables are still measured at the allocated basis. For detailed example, see SFAS No. 140 paragraph 
65 and amendment in SFAS No. 156.   
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servicing assets to be measured and recognized at fair value, SFAS No. 156 allows an accounting 
method that recognizes internally created value without going through the market mechanism 
such as sales. In other words, the interaction of the financial-components approach and the fair 
value measurement basis gives financial asset transfers the opportunity to recognize internally 
created value that otherwise would not be recognized until economic benefits are materialized as 
revenues. Considering that servicing assets are thinly traded and each service is unique to the 
underlying financial assets, fair values of the servicing assets cannot be easily verified. As a 
result, gain-on-asset-transfer cannot be easily verified.  
 
2.3 Previous Research  
In the literature, there is a clear shortage of studies focusing on servicing assets as a 
financial-component. Most studies either address GOS as a whole or study the market reactions 
to accounting numbers reported under the financial-component approach. 
Niu (2007) studies the stock market’s reactions to GOS reported under the financial-
components approach and finds a positive association between GOS and stock returns. The 
interpretation is that market participants treat GOS in the same manner as they treat other 
earnings information. The fact that GOS under the financial-components approach is of an 
estimated nature does not negatively affect investor’s perception of the reported numbers. An, 
Dong and Gabriel (2009) estimate the pricing effects of the financial-components approach and 
find that with internally created values recognized upon assets securitizations, pricing of the 
underlying loans are reduced. Overall, securitizations create values through the financial 
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components; given the reduced loan pricing, financial assets transferors, through securitization, 
still achieve substantial profits by recognizing values of other financial components.  
Another line of study considers the risk retention in evaluating whether the market treats 
securitization as sales or secured borrowings (Niu and Richardson 2006, Chen, Liu and Ryan 
2008, Landsman, Peasnell and Shakespeare 2008). The general findings are that the stock market 
treats securitizations almost like secured borrowings. That is, risks associated with the 
underlying assets are viewed as belonging to the transferor, not the transferee, usually a special 
purpose entity. Those studies do not specifically address the financial-components approach. 
Both Chen, Liu and Ryan (2008) as well as Landsman, Peasnell and Shakespeare (2008) 
mentioned an implicit recourse liability to the transferor. If the financial-components approach is 
strictly applied, there should be no implicit asset or liability; every component should be 
explicitly measured and recognized before GOS can be calculated. In that sense, there is a 
deviation from the approach required by the accounting standards. Nevertheless, none of the 
studies specifically address the valuation of servicing asset or liability as a financial component 
in securitization.    
The implicit recourse liability and the deviation from the strict application of the 
financial-components approach lead to the question of possible earnings management. Another 
line of study examines GOS as a potential vehicle for earnings management. Dechow and 
Shakespeare (2009) question if managers time securitization transactions to obtain accounting 
benefits. They find that 41 percent of the quarter’s asset securitization transactions occur in the 
third month of the quarter, and almost half of these occur in the last five days of the quarter. This 
implies that securitization is used as an earnings management vehicle. Dechow, Myers and 
Shakespeare (2008) also study whether GOS is used as an earnings management vehicle with 
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compensation benefits. Their findings support the hypothesis that managers engage in earnings 
management through GOS. They find that firms report larger gain on securitization amounts 
when pre-securitization earnings are low or lower than the prior year’s level. In terms of the 
effects on management’s compensation, GOS is not treated substantially different from other 
components of earnings. CEO’s equity compensation is almost as sensitive to GOS as to other 
gains. These findings mirror that of Niu (2007). Information users, internally or externally do not 
differentiate GOS from other components of earnings. 
One important assumption in Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2008) is that GOS is 
completely discretionary. Following the financial-components approach, under both SFAS No. 
140 and No. 156, GOS is calculated based on fair values of all components. If fair values of all 
components can be reached and verified independently, then their assumption will not hold true; 
GOS is not completely discretionary. To use GOS as an earnings management vehicle, the key 
lies in the fair value estimation for all financial-components. The fact that not all components 
have readily available fair values, and that managers have to exercise discretion in their estimates, 
give reasonable support that GOS is completely discretionary. The discretionary nature of 
unverifiable fair value accounting has been studied on different accounting topics and the effects 
of earnings management have been documented (Ramanna and Watts 2008). This study follows 
previous literature and treats GOS as completely discretionary. Furthermore, the servicing asset 
or liability is considered an accounting accrual that summarizes future economic benefits in 
calculating GOS in the period of financial asset securitization.   
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3. Hypotheses Development and Research Design   
3.1 Hypotheses 
Following Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare (2008), this study hypothesizes that 
managers have incentives to increase accounting earnings using GOS when earnings before GOS 
are low or negative. The initial hypothesis is that there is a negative relationship between GOS 
and earnings before GOS. From SFAS No. 140 to No. 156, the accounting for servicing assets, 
and thus the recognition of GOS, are further unhinged from the cost of the underlying financial 
assets and focus entirely on fair value, which is unobservable. If managers use GOS as a vehicle 
to increase accounting earnings under SFAS No. 140, then we expect to see the effects continue 
under SFAS No. 156. It is therefore hypothesized that there is a negative relation between the 
size of GOS and pre-GOS earnings under both SFAS No. 140 and No. 156.  
Notice that GOS and servicing assets are potential earnings-smoothing vehicles. 
Managers can achieve the desired effects through their discretion over the timing and amount of 
financial assets securitization and through the assumptions used to reach fair value of financial 
components. This study focuses on the relation between GOS and pre-GOS earnings but does not 
include variables to hypothesize managers’ decreasing incentives (Riedl 2004). Presumably, if 
there are incentives for managers to decrease earnings, securitizations are not used as a vehicle, 
or simply delayed.  
H1: There is a significant negative relation between GOS and pre-GOS earnings under 
both SFAS No. 140 and No. 156. 
To further explore the property of servicing assets recognition and its impact on earnings, 
this study develops a measurement of the quality of servicing assets recognition. SFAS No. 156 
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defines servicing assets as ―the contract to service financial assets under which the estimated 
future revenues from contractually specified servicing fees and other ancillary revenues are 
expected to more than adequately compensate the servicer.‖ By definition, valuation of servicing 
assets depends heavily on the estimation of future events. To this end, similar to any other 
accounting accrual, the quality of servicing assets valuation can be measured by the estimation 
errors (Dechow and Dichev 2002); the less the estimation errors, the more precise the 
recognition of servicing assets, and the better the quality of servicing assets valuation.  
Unlike other accounting accruals where estimation errors are estimated by the error term 
in a regression model that regresses working capital against cash flows (Dechow and Dichev 
2002), estimation errors of servicing assets are captured by ―net servicing fees‖ reported on the 
financial statements. Following the financial-components approach, servicing assets summarize 
future benefits of servicing upon securitization, so when benefits eventually materialize in the 
form of cash inflows, it cannot be recognized again, or else that would be double-counting. 
Instead, when fees or other ancillary revenues are collected, they should be netted against the 
amortization of the servicing assets. If servicing assets are precisely estimated and amortized, the 
benefits (cash flows) should be washed by the amortization. In that sense, any reported ―net 
servicing fees‖ represents estimation errors. The netting effects and the reporting of the errors are 
clearly explained in the definition of the Call Reports that banks file with the Federal Reserve 
System
5
.     
                                                          
5
 In the Call Reports, net servicing fees “report income from servicing real estate mortgage, credit cards, and other 
financial assets held by others. Report any premiums received in lieu of regular servicing fees on such loans only as 
earned over the life of the loans. For servicing assets and liabilities measured under the amortization method, 
banks should report servicing income net of the related servicing assets’ amortization expense, include 
impairments recognized on servicing assets, and also include increases in servicing liabilities recognized when 
subsequent events have increased the fair value of the liabilities above its carrying amount. For servicing assets 
14 
 
This study looks at the magnitude of the reported net servicing fees as an indicator of the 
estimation error. The closer the net servicing fee is to zero, the less estimation error, and the 
better quality of servicing assets valuation. Since servicing assets have different expected 
durations, and banks continue to issue new securitizations, ―net servicing fees‖, or the error term, 
in the current period is treated as an outcome of a moving average. This study does not attempt 
to further average this error term.  
If the valuation of servicing assets, and thus the recognition of GOS, is used by managers 
as an earnings-smoothing vehicle, it is hypothesized that the quality of servicing assets valuation 
is negatively related to managers’ earnings-increasing incentives. Stated in the operational form, 
when estimation errors, or ―net servicing fees‖ increases, it is more likely GOS is used as an 
earnings management vehicle.   
H2: When GOS is used as an earnings-smoothing vehicle, the quality of servicing assets 
valuation decreases.  
 
3.2 Research Design 
We first replicate the Dechow, Myers, and Shakespeare (2008) results for the SFAS 
No.140 period and extend it to the SFAS No. 156 period through the following model: 
GOSiq = α0 + β1 INCiq+ β2 D*INCiq + β3 MBSiq + β4 CONSBSiq + β5 COMMBS + εiq   (1) 
        
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and liabilities re-measured at fair value under the fair value option, include changes in the fair value of these 
servicing assets and liabilities. “ 
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Where GOSiq   = Net securitization income for bank i in quarter q. (from Schedule HI – 
consolidated income statement)
6
; 
INCiq = the income benchmark used as the earnings management incentive proxy which 
is either Pre-GOS or ∆Pre-GOSiq; 
Pre-GOSiq = Net income for bank i in quarter q (Schedule HI) less net securitization 
income during quarter (GOS); 
∆Pre-GOSiq = Pre-GOS earnings in current quarter – Pre-GOS earnings in same quarter 
in prior year; 
D = A dummy variable, where D=0 for observations under SFAS No. 140 and D=1, for 
observations under SFAS No. 156. Therefore, the coefficients for Pre-GOS earnings are 
β1 for observations under No. 140 and (β1+β3) for observations under No. 156; for ∆Pre-
GOS are β2 for observations under No. 140 and (β2+β4) for observations under No. 156; 
MBSiq = Outstanding principal balance of 1-4 family residential loans sold and 
securitized with servicing retained or recourse or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements for bank i in quarter q (Schedule HC-S); 
CONSBSiq = Outstanding principal balance of consumer loans sold and securitized with 
servicing retained or recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements for bank i in 
quarter q (Schedule HC-S); consumer loans include home-equity lines, credit card 
receivables, auto loans, and other consumer loans; 
                                                          
6
 All bank holding companies with assets greater than $500 Million and those meeting other criteria, regardless of 
size are required to report on a quarterly basis form FR Y-9C (Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding 
Companies). These include Schedule HI (Consolidated Income Statement), Schedule HC (Consolidated Balance 
Sheet) in addition to sub-schedules. Most notably, schedule HC-S (Servicing, Securitization, and Asset Sale 
Activities) include off-balance sheet information about the banks’ asset securitization activities.  
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COMMBSiq = Outstanding principal balance of commercial loans sold and securitized 
with servicing retained or recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements for bank 
i in quarter q (Schedule HC-S); commercial loans include commercial and industrial 
loans as well as all other loans, leases, and assets; 
 ε1iq  = The error term.  
All variables other than total assets are deflated by prior quarter total assets to adjust for 
heteroscedasticity. The two earnings variables, Pre-GOS and ∆Pre-GOS, are the proxies for 
incentives to manage earnings. Specifically, lower levels of pre-GOS are expected to be 
associated with income-increasing management through GOS. Hence we expect a negative 
coefficient. The same holds for ∆Pre-GOS. We also add the size of the off-balance sheet 
securitized assets as control variables. GOS should be higher for banks with higher securitization 
and the amount of gains may differ depending on the different types of loans securitized. This is 
true since the three types of loans hold inherently different levels of risk (See Chen, Liu and 
Ryan, 2008).  Mortgage-backed securities are the least risky types of loans, followed by 
consumer loans, followed by commercial loans. The total of these three types of securities 
constitute asset-backed securities (ABS). 
To test for H1, a pooled-firm-quarter sample ordinary least square regression is used to 
estimate the coefficients, which infer the relationship between GOS and Pre-GOS earnings in the 
SFAS156 period. 
The second hypothesis relates to the quality of servicing assets valuation. We expect the 
quality of the servicing asset valuation to be negatively related to managers’ earnings-increasing 
incentives. To test for H2, the same regression is used, but firm-quarter observations are sorted 
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into decile subsamples based on the absolute magnitude of net servicing fees, which proxies for 
the estimation errors. Lower deciles have lower estimation error and so it is expected that GOS is 
not heavily used as an earnings management vehicle. 
 
3.3 Sampling Procedure 
We obtain quarterly financial data from the Commercial Bank Database, which collects 
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB Chicago). This database contains data of 
all banks filing the Report of Condition and Income (named ―Call Report‖) that are regulated by 
the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Comptroller 
of the Currency. These reports include balance sheet, income statement, risk-based capital 
measures and off-balance sheet data. The database includes commercial banks and savings banks 
and has data available quarterly from 1976. We collect data from the quarter ending March 31rst, 
2001, which is the effective date for accounting under SFAS No. 140, up to the quarter ending 
December 31rst, 2008.
7
 SFAS No. 156 was issued in March 2006 and stated that ―An entity 
should adopt this Statement as of the beginning of its first fiscal year that begins after September 
15, 2006. Earlier adoption is permitted as of the beginning of an entity’s fiscal year, provided the 
entity has not yet issued financial statements, including interim financial statements, for any 
period of that fiscal year. The effective date of this Statement is the date an entity adopts the 
requirements of this Statement.‖8 The Pre-SFAS156 period includes all quarters from March 
2001 up to December 2005 and the post-SFAS156 period includes are all quarters in the years 
2007 and 2008. The year 2006 is dropped from the analysis to alleviate any problems associated 
                                                          
7
 This was the latest available date at the time of data collection. 
8
 See http://fasb.org/pdf/fas156.pdf , p.3. 
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with early-adopters. This results in a sample of 1,448 observations with non-missing variables, 
which consist of 1,062 bank/quarter observations in the pre-SFAS156 period and 386 
bank/quarter observations in the post-SFAS156 period. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample (n=1,448 bank/quarter 
observations), and by pre and post-adoption periods.  
((Table 1)) 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the full sample. The mean and median GOS are 
0.021 and 0.000, respectively. On average banks incurred a loss before the GOS, as the mean 
pre-GOS is -0.009 (the median is 0.005). The banks on average had a high prevalence of off-
balance sheet total asset-backed securities (mean and median ABS are 0.528 and 0.048, 
respectively). These asset-backed securities included mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
consumer-backed securities (CONSBS) and commercial-backed securities (COMMBS). The 
financial institutions retained a small portion of these loans as interest-only strips or subordinated 
securities and residual interests (mean and median ARI are 0.022 and 0.000, respectively).
9
 Net 
servicing fees, which is used as a proxy for estimation error has a mean and median of 0.007 and 
0.000, respectively. The banks in the sample are large with log total assets on average of $16 
Million. 
                                                          
9
 ARI is set to zero if it is missing. 
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Panel B provides descriptive statistics in the period 2001-2005 (Pre-SFAS156 period). The 
GOS and Pre-GOS are almost identical to the full sample (mean and median GOS is 0.022 and 
0.000, respectively, and mean and median and Pre-GOS are -0.009 and 0.006, respectively). The 
size of total assets is smaller in these years (mean and median log (TA) is $15.5M and $15.9M, 
respectively).  
Panel C provides descriptive statistics in the post-SFAS156 adoption period (years 2007 
and 2008). The GOS is slightly smaller than in the full sample (mean and median is 0.020 and 
0.000, respectively). The pre-GOS is similar to the pre-SFAS156 period (mean and median is -
0.009 and 0.003, respectively). Total asset backed securities during this period is smaller (mean 
and median is 0.446 and 0.018, respectively). This means that the banks in this period were able 
to record almost the same amount of GOS for a smaller amount of securitization (mean 
GOS/ABS = 4.5% in SFAS No. 156 period vs. 3.9% in SFAS No. 140 period). The size of the 
banks is similar to that in the earlier period (mean of log (TA) is $15.5 and median is $15.5M). 
Table 2 provides Pearson correlation coefficients between the various variables in the 
period before SFAS156 (Panel A) and after SFAS156 (Panel B). As expected, there is a high 
positive correlation between Pre-GOS and ∆Pre-GOS (coefficient = 0.864 and 0.341 in panel A 
and panel B, respectively). There is a high negative correlation between GOS and Pre-GOS 
(coefficient = -0.632 and –0.965 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively), which corroborates prior 
evidence of using the gain on sale as an earnings management vehicle to smooth net income. It is 
interesting to note that the correlation is much higher in the period after adoption of SFAS156. 
We also note that the net servicing fee (FEE) is highly correlated with GOS (coefficient = 0.644 
and 0.886 in Panel A and B, respectively) as well as ABS (coefficient = 0.540 and 0.893 in Panel 
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A and Panel B, respectively). This indicates that the estimation error, FEE, is higher when there 
are more asset-backed securities. At the same time, there is also high GOS. 
((Table 2)) 
 
4.2 GOS and Earnings-Smoothing Incentives 
Our first hypothesis deals with earnings management incentives and the use of asset 
securitization as a vehicle to smooth income. Prior research (Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 
2008) has used the level of pre-GOS income and the change in pre-GOS income as benchmarks 
for management and thus both are indicators of earnings management incentives. Specifically, 
when pre-GOS is low or negative, management has incentives to use whatever tools they have to 
increase income (such as asset securitization to record a gain on securitization). Similarly, when 
the change in income prior to securitization is negative, management have the same incentives to 
increase income. SFAS No. 156 provides, in some cases, opportunities to record higher amounts 
of GOS. First, we examine the relationship between GOS and both pre-GOS and pre-GOS in 
both pre and post-SFAS156 periods. We hypothesize that there will be a significant negative 
association between these variables in both periods, which is consistent with an income-
increasing explanation. To test whether there is an incremental earnings-management effect after 
the adoption of SFAS No. 156, we use a pooled ordinary least-square regression for the full 
sample (N=1,488) as shown in the regression (1) with GOS as the dependent variable adding a 
dummy variable for the period after adoption and its interaction with pre-GOS and ∆pre-GOS. 
We add the size of the separate asset-backed securities MBS, CONSBS, and COMMBS) in the 
regressions to control for the difference in levels of securitization and fair value treatment. The 
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results appear in table 3. We use the level of income in model (1) and the change in income in 
model (2) to represent the earnings-smoothing variable of interest. 
((Table 3)) 
The first column presents the coefficients and t-values including the level of earnings 
before gain on securitization as the independent variable. The coefficient on Pre-GOS is as 
expected negative and significant (β1=-0.284 and t-value=-22.04). The dummy variable, D (D=1 
in post SFAS156 adoption periods and 0 otherwise), is used to test the significance of income 
smoothing in the SFAS156 period. The coefficient β1+β2 is more negative at -0.712 and there is 
incremental significance during the SFAS156 period (t-value=-12.91). In model (2), we include 
the change in earnings before gain on securitization as the independent variable. The coefficient 
β1+β2 is more negative at -0.804 and there is incremental significance during the SFAS156 
period (t-value=-3.16). These results indicate that after the SFAS No. 156 adoption, there is more 
evidence of income smoothing. The coefficients for the three types of asset-backed securities are 
as expected. GOS is positively associated with all three types of asset-backed securities in both 
model (1) and model (2). The adjusted R
2
 of both regressions is quite high (Adjusted R
2
 = 9.15% 
and 70.10% for model (1) and model (2), respectively), which means that the GOS is captured by 
the independent variables included in the models.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that under both SFAS No. 140 and No. 156, there is 
income-smoothing using the gain from securitization account. This extends the results shown in 
Dechow, Myers and Shakespeare 2008 in the post-SFAS156 adoption period. In addition, there 
is a higher association between GOS and pre-GOS as well as pre-GOS in the post-SFAS156 
period, implying a higher magnitude of income-smoothing following the adoption of SFAS156. 
22 
 
4.3 Quality of Servicing Assets Valuation and Earnings Management 
Our second hypothesis deals with the quality of servicing asset valuation when there are 
incentives to manage earnings. We hypothesize that when GOS is used as an earnings-smoothing 
vehicle, the quality of servicing assets valuation decreases. Since there is no known measure of 
quality of servicing asset valuation, we use the value of ―Net servicing fees‖ as a proxy. This 
account reports the difference between actual fees earned from securitized loans and the 
amortization/fair value revaluation. We expect that the higher the net servicing fee (hereafter, 
FEE) account, the lower the quality of the estimated asset/liability at the time of securitization. In 
essence, the higher the levels of estimation error, the higher the association between GOS and 
pre-GOS (higher earnings management). We divide all observations into deciles based on the 
value of FEE. There are 1,368 observations that have positive values of FEE and only 80 
observations that have negative values of FEE. This means that most of the observations (94%) 
report higher income or fees from their securitized asset than they report in amortization expense 
(or reduction in FMV of asset or increase in FMV of liability). We divide the 1,448 observations 
into deciles based on the actual value of FEE. We expect that earnings management behavior 
will be more prominent in the tails of the distribution i.e. in the first and last deciles, whereas the 
middle deciles will have the least earnings management behavior. Furthermore, since most net 
servicing fees are positive, we expect that the higher deciles will show more earnings 
management behavior than the lower fees. We run regression 1 for the separate deciles and 
examine the coefficients β1  as well as the sum of the coefficients β1+ β2 to test our hypothesis in 
the SFAS 156 period. 
((Table 4)) 
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The results in table 4 show evidence of the association between the net servicing fees and 
earnings management behavior. Specifically, the highest 3 deciles, which have the highest 
positive estimation error (highest positive values of FEE), show evidence of earnings-smoothing 
under SFAS140 and SFAS156 (β1 = -0.189, -0.939, and -0.216 in deciles 8, 9, and 10, 
respectively; β2 = -0.856, -0.024, and -0.340 in deciles 8, 9, and 10, respectively, all significant at 
the 1 percent level). Decile 1 (with the most negative FEE observations) indicates evidence of 
earnings smoothing in the SFAS140 period (β1 = -0.783, significant at the 1 percent level) but no 
evidence of incremental effect post-SFAS (β2 = 0.650, t-statistic = 1.89). The remaining deciles 
have inconsistent behavior, with either only β1 significantly negative (decile 5) or only β2 
negative and significant (deciles 6 and 7). There is a high explanatory power for the regressions 
in all deciles, other than in decile 5 (adjusted R
2
 is above 20% in all regressions, other than in 
decile 5). These results show additional evidence of using GOS as an earnings management 
vehicle. Untabulated results using the change in income as the independent variable, provides 
similar results. 
To further test the association between the earnings smoothing behavior and the 
estimation error proxy, we repeat the above analysis in deciles of the absolute value of FEE, 
rather than the actual FEE amount. In this case, we expect earnings smoothing behavior to be 
more apparent in the larger deciles. The results appear in table 5. 
((Table 5)) 
As in the previous results, the highest 3 deciles, which have the largest magnitude of the 
estimation error (highest absolute values of FEE), show evidence of earnings-smoothing under 
SFAS140 and SFAS156 (β1 = -0.189, -0.928, and -0.215 in deciles 8, 9, and 10, respectively; β2 
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= -0.761, -0.019, and -0.342 in deciles 8, 9, and 10, respectively). The remaining deciles have 
inconsistent behavior, with either only β1 significantly negative (deciles 1, 3 and 5) or only β2 
negative and significant (deciles 6 and 7). These results provide additional evidence of using 
GOS as an earnings management vehicle. Untabulated results using the change in income as the 
independent variable, provides similar results. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the association between managers’ earnings management incentives 
and the recognition of gains on financial assets securitizations under SFAS No. 140 and SFAS 
No.156; specifically, we address the change of accounting for servicing assets, which is an 
important component of GOS recognition. GOS under SFAS No. 140 has been questioned as a 
vehicle for earnings management (Dechow, Myers, Shakespeare 2008). Under SFAS No. 156, 
servicing assets or liabilities is no longer measured based on an allocated amount, instead a fair 
value has to be reached directly. To this end, gains or losses recognized upon financial assets 
securitizations are unhinged from their acquisition cost basis. By requiring servicing assets to be 
measured and recognized at fair value, SFAS No. 156 allows an accounting method that 
recognizes internally created value without going through the market mechanism such as sales. 
Considering that there is no active trading market for such servicing assets or liabilities and that 
costs and benefits to service each underlying financial asset is unique, the question is whether 
SFAS No. 156 extends SFAS No. 140 by providing an even more convenient vehicle for 
earnings management through the recognition of internally created values without going through 
the market mechanism.  
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This study extends previous study on GOS under SFAS No. 140 by addressing the issue 
whether GOS under SFAS No. 156 is more or less associated with management’s incentives to 
manage earnings. The empirical findings support that there is a stronger association between 
GOS and both income before GOS and change in income before GOS, variables commonly used 
to proxy for managers’ earnings management incentives.  
We also study the association between the quality of servicing assets recognition, as 
proxied by the magnitude of net servicing fees, and earnings management incentives. Following 
the notion that servicing assets or liabilities carried on the balance sheets summarize future 
benefits or obligations in servicing the underlying financial assets, concepts from the valuation of 
accounting accruals (Dechow and Dichev 2002) are borrowed to evaluate the quality of servicing 
assets recognition, and net servicing fees is used as a proxy for the errors in valuing servicing 
assets and liabilities. We find evidence that the higher the measurement errors for servicing 
assets (the higher net servicing fees), the higher the association between GOS and earnings 
management incentives. These findings provide further evidence that servicing assets valuations 
under both SFAS No. 140 and No. 156 are influenced by earnings management incentives. 
However, it is acknowledged that further studies of the properties of servicing assets are needed 
if it is treated as an accounting accrual carried at the unobservable fair value. 
Overall, empirical results in this study are in line with the hypotheses that GOS and 
servicing assets recognitions in the post SFAS No. 156 period provide further opportunities for 
earnings management. Further study is needed to eliminate other factors that may affect the 
association between the GOS and pre-GOS income. Also the research can be extended to study 
the characteristics of the securitized assets and how earnings management behavior is affected by 
different types of loans. At the core of all securitization issues, however, is fair value accounting 
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and the opportunities it provides for earnings management. If internally created values, such as 
internally originated servicing assets, can be recognized through accounting earnings while there 
are no readily available, openly observable, fair values, then influences from managers’ earnings 
management incentives are inevitable.   
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Appendix: Variable definitions: 
 
Variable name Definition 
GOSiq Net gain on securitization for bank i in quarter q / Total assets for bank i 
in quarter q-1 
Pre-GOSiq Net income before gain on securitization for bank i in quarter q / Total 
assets for bank i in quarter q-1 
Pre-GOSiq Change in net income before gain on securitization = net income before 
gain on securitization for bank i in quarter q less net income before gain 
on securitization in q-4 (same quarter of previous year) 
D Dummy variable which equals 1 in post-SFAS156 adoption period and 
equals 0 in pre-SFAS156 adoption period 
SECiq Total held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities on balance sheet 
for bank i in quarter q / Total assets for bank i in quarter q-1 
MBSiq Total mortgage-backed securities (off-balance sheet) for bank i in quarter 
q / Total assets for bank i in quarter q-1 
CONSBSiq Total consumer loan-backed securities for bank i in quarter q / Total assets 
for bank i in quarter q-1 
COMMiq Total commercial loan-backed securities for bank i in quarter q / Total 
assets for bank i in quarter q-1 
ABSiq Total asset-backed securities (off-balance sheet) for bank i in quarter q = 
mortgage-backed securities, commercial loan-backed securities and 
consumer loan-backed securities / Total assets for bank i in quarter q-1 
ARIiq Total retained interest on asset-backed securities for bank i in quarter q = 
retained interest from mortgage-backed securities, commercial loan-
backed securities, and consumer loan-backed securities / Total assets for 
bank i in quarter q-1 
FEEiq Net servicing fees for bank i in quarter q / Total assets for bank i in 
quarter q-1 
Log(TAiq) Logarithm of total assets for bank i in quarter q 
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Exhibit 1: Calculation of Gain on Securitization under SFAS140 and SFAS156: 
Example: A Company sold $1,000 loan (10% interest) plus right to receive 8% interest for $1,000; it retains 
servicing rights and receives 1% of interest as servicing fee. Remaining 1% is an interest-only strip receivable. The 
fair market value of the servicing asset and interest-only strip is estimated at 40 and 60, respectively. 
Panel A: Under SFAS 140: 
 
Gain on Securitization = FMV of loan sold – Carrying amount of loan sold  
= 1,000 – 910 = $90 
 
Panel B: Under SFAS 156: 
 
 FMV  
 
% of total FMV  Carrying amount 
Loans sold $1,040 
 
95 $946 
Interest-only strip 60 
 
5 54 
 $1,100 
 
100 $1,000 
 
Gain in Securitization = FMV of loan sold (including servicing asset) – Carrying amount of loan sold  
= 1,040 – 946 = $94 
 
 
 
This example is taken from SFAS No. 140 (2000) and SFAS No. 156 (2006) as published by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. 
  
 Fair Market Value 
(FMV)  
% of total FMV  Carrying amount 
Loan sold $1,000 
 
91 $910  
Servicing asset 40 
 
3.6 36 
Interest-only strip 60 
 
5.4 54 
Total $1,100 
 
100 $1,000 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: 
Panel A: Full sample (N=1,448) 
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev 
GOS 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.070 
Pre-GOS -0.009 0.005 -0.001 0.010 0.077 
Pre-GOS -0.003 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.043 
SEC 0.183 0.152 0.074 0.258 0.147 
ABS 0.528 0.048 0.000 0.556 1.056 
ARI 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.063 
FEE 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.019 
Log(TA) 15.505 15.742 13.165 17.453 2.587 
 
 
Panel B: Pre-SFAS156   (N=1,062)                                     
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev. 
GOS 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.069 
Pre-GOS -0.009 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.084 
∆Pre-GOS -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.050 
SEC 0.189 0.161 0.073 0.269 0.148 
ABS 0.558 0.056 0.000 0.585 1.094 
ARI 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.053 
FEE 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.021 
Log(TA) 15.499 15.878 13.241 17.257 2.425 
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Panel C: Post-SFAS156 (N=386) 
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std. Dev. 
GOS 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.072 
Pre-GOS -0.009 0.003 -0.002 0.008 0.053 
∆Pre-GOS -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.011 
SEC 0.166 0.127 0.074 0.204 0.144 
ABS 0.446 0.018 0.000 0.542 0.940 
ARI 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.085 
FEE 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.013 
Log(TA) 15.521 15.507 12.950 18.056 2.990 
See appendix for definition of variables. 
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Table 2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-values): 
 
Panel A: Pre-SFAS156 Period:  
 
Pre-GOS ∆Pre-GOS SEC ABS ARI FEE Log(TA) 
GOS -0.632 -0.286 -0.209 0.804 0.645 0.644 -0.211 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pre-GOS 1.000 0.864 0.083 -0.446 -0.356 -0.833 0.195 
  
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
∆Pre-GOS 
 
1.000 0.026 -0.133 -0.082 -0.648 0.127 
   
(0.389) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
SEC 
  
1.000 -0.356 -0.181 -0.177 -0.230 
    
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ABS 
   
1.000 0.638 0.540 -0.156 
     
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ARI 
    
1.000 0.437 -0.139 
      
(0.001) (0.001) 
FEE 
     
1.000 -0.192 
      
 (0.001) 
 
Panel B: Post-SFAS156 Period: 
 
Pre-GOS ∆Pre-GOS SEC ABS ARI FEE Log(TA) 
GOS -0.965 -0.231 -0.120 0.840 0.693 0.886 -0.117 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) 
Pre-GOS 1.000 0.341 0.137 -0.842 -0.613 -0.874 0.105 
  
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) 
∆Pre-GOS 
 
1.000 0.096 -0.176 0.046 -0.137 -0.017 
   
(0.061) (0.001) (0.365) (0.007) (0.736) 
SEC 
  
1.000 -0.209 0.008 -0.160 -0.417 
    
(0.001) (0.882) (0.002) (0.001) 
ABS 
   
1.000 0.732 0.893 -0.059 
     
(0.001) (0.001) (0.251) 
ARI 
    
1.000 0.719 -0.126 
      
(0.001) (0.013) 
FEE 
     
1.000 0.084 
      
 (0.010) 
See appendix for definition of variables. 
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Table 3: Results of Regressions of GOS on Income and Income Change as Incentives for Earnings 
Management: 
The results show the coefficients (t-values) from the following regression: (N=1,448) 
GOSiq = α0 + β1 INCiq+ β2 D*INCiq + β3 MBSiq + β4 CONSBSiq + β5 COMMBS + εiq 
Where INCiq = Pre-GOSiq or ∆Pre-GOSiq  
Variable Predicted Sign Model(1) 
 
Model(2) 
 
Pre-GOS - -0.284 (-22.04)
* 
  
D*Pre-GOS - -0.428 (-12.91)
* 
 
 
∆Pre-GOS -   -0.236 (-9.95)* 
D*Pre-GOS -   -0.568 (-3.16)
* 
MBS + 0.004 (0.94) 0.005 (0.98)
 
CONSBS + 0.040 (40.78)
* 
0.053 (54.45)
* 
COMMBS + 0.033 (10.72)
* 
0.043 (12.03)
* 
      
Adjusted R
2 
 79.15% 70.10% 
See appendix for definition of variables. 
*Significant at levels less than 0.01 
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Table 4: Results of Regressions of GOS on Income in Deciles of FEE (Net Servicing Fee): 
The results show the coefficients (t-values) from the following regression: 
GOSiq = α0 + β1 Pre-GOSiq+ β2 D*Pre-GOSiq + β3 MBSiq + β4 CONSBSiq + β5 COMMBS + εiq 
Variable Decile1 Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 Decile6 Decile7 Decile8 Decile9 Decile10 
Pre-GOS -0.783 -0.088 -0.066 -0.004 -0.085 0.083 0.036 -0.189 -0.939 -0.216 
 (-3.42)
* 
(-1.78) (-1.70) (-0.25) (-4.90)
* 
(23.59)
* 
(1.59) (-2.75)
* 
(-24.16)
* 
(-6.83)
* 
D*Pre-GOS 0.650 0.044 0.100 0.025 0.051 -0.076 -0.082 -0.856 -0.024 -0.340 
 (1.89) (0.75) (2.35) (1.25) (2.08) (-5.13)
* 
(-2.67)
* 
(-4.57)
* 
 (-0.29) (-4.23)
* 
MBS 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.032 0.784 
 (0.86) (-0.10) (0.80) (-0.11) (1.15) (2.65)
* 
(0.17) (-1.58) (-1.33) (1.10) 
CONSBS 0.031 0.013 0.053 0.001 0.028 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.004 0.065 
 (11.01)
* 
(27.34)
* 
(23.23)
* 
(1.04) (28.19)
* 
(2.20) (5.43)
* 
(2.81)
* 
(2.43)
* 
(15.85)
* 
COMMBS -0.013 -0.006 -0.012 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.002 0.069 
 (-0.17)  (-0.54) (-1.53) (0.51)  (-0.70) (1.41) (3.12)
* 
(1.27) (0.86) (6.10)
* 
           
Adjusted R
2 
56.98% 92.76% 79.12% -1.53% 97.25% 79.59% 20.58% 33.11% 86.05% 77.66% 
See appendix for definition of variables. 
*Significant at levels less than 0.01 
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Table 5: Results of Regressions of GOS on Income in Deciles of Absolute Values of FEE (Net Servicing Fee): 
The results show the coefficients (t-values) from the following regression: 
GOSiq = α0 + β1 Pre-GOSiq+ β2 D*Pre-GOSiq + β3 MBSiq + β4 CONSBSiq + β5 COMMBS + εiq 
Variable Decile1 Decile2 Decile3 Decile4 Decile5 Decile6 Decile7 Decile8 Decile9 Decile10 
Pre-GOS -0.805 -0.012 -0.146 0.010 -0.090 0.082 0.014 -0.189 -0.928 -0.215 
 (-2.57)
* 
(-0.58) (-3.74)
* 
(0.77) (-5.06)
* 
(21.54)
* 
(0.61) (-2.74)
* 
(-23.78)
* 
(-6.77)
* 
D*Pre-GOS 0.328 -0.003 0.166 0.013 0.051 -0.084 -0.148 -0.761 -0.019 -0.342 
 (0.88) (-0.10) (3.39)
* 
(0.82) (1.98) (-7.04)
* 
(-3.67)
* 
(-4.28)
* 
(-0.22) (-4.24)
* 
MBS -0.010 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.032 0.744 
 (-0.34) (1.64) (0.14) (0.84) (1.17) (1.84) (0.16) (-2.01) (-1.32) (1.04) 
CONSBS 0.015 0.012 0.049 0.001 0.028 0.003 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.064 
 (5.60)
* 
(2.51)
* 
(18.85)
* 
(1.01) (27.21)
* 
(1.49) (6.28)
* 
(2.74)
* 
(2.56)
* 
(15.85)
* 
COMMBS -0.039 -0.003 -0.013 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.068 
 (-0.53) (-0.83) (-1.11) (-0.13) (0.39) (1.29) (3.93)
* 
(1.10) (0.87) (6.01)
* 
           
Adjusted R
2 
48.53% 3.25% 71.41% -0.67% 97.03% 76.23% 30.00% 32.63% 85.64% 77.68% 
See appendix for definition of variables. 
*Significant at levels less than 0.01. 
